Declaratory policy

Jeffrey Lewis has an interesting and thought-provoking post on Arms Control Wonk that argues that the United States should change its declaratory policy about nuclear weapons. Instead of saying what we will or won't do in certain circumstances, Jeffrey suggests we talk about what our reasons are for possessing nuclear weapons.

If you talk about what specific circumstances constrain our use of nuclear weapons - we won't ever use them first, for example, or we'll use them to counter an attack with nuclear weapons but not an attack with chemical weapons - this gives rise, Jeffrey argues, to various problems. You are constrained in any future scenario. And people are free to constantly trip you up with tricky what-if questions.

It's a clever suggestion: no matter what the specifics of the situation are, my intentions will always remain the same. I say, "I intend to only use nuclear weapons to protect the national well-being" and this doesn't really constrain my choices in any future situation. Lincoln would certainly have supported Jeffrey's suggestion: he once famously said, "My policy is to have no policy," because he believed that rather than making an ironclad rule for all situations, it was better to meet each situation as it came. By making a rule before a situation arose, you tied your own hands.

Declarations exist, however, as a way of binding the speaker. They are often intended to reassure or frighten, and the more inexact the phrasing, the less well the declaration does its job. It is more comfortable for the speaker to make inexact declarations and leaves him more room to change his mind. But I thought the whole point of all that Schelling-esque threat theory that (I think) Jeffrey likes is to pre-commit yourself. How can nuclear deterrence work if the threat that you commit to is vague or uncertain?

The problem with statements of intention is that they can be so unbinding as to be almost nonexistent. "I intend to always do the right thing," neither reassures my friends or frightens my enemies. 

Actions are specific. Intentions are, at some level, unmeasurable. Couching declaratory policy in the language of intention makes it vaguer, more flexible, less binding and less apt to be pinned into some contradiction. But it also substantially weakens the declaration (and thus your commitment to your position).

It may be that Jeffrey believes that nuclear deterrence is now so much less important than it was that substantially softening our declaratory policy (and thus weakening nuclear deterrence) is Ok. Or that the benefit of the increased room for maneuver that his new formulation puts down is not offset by the loss in the power of nuclear deterrence. He may be right. I'd be interested to hear him argue this point explicitly, however. Stuff about officials being tied in knots at meetings doesn't persuade me much.

I think this is a smart and useful suggestion. But there's more to be said about it.

Update on Friday, January 15, 2010 at 03:08PM by Ward Wilson

Thinking further about this, I'm not sure that characterizing Jeffrey's suggestion as advocating a shift to a statement about intention is completely fair. He actually talks about giving reasons why we possess them. But there's something here that troubles me and I want to think more about this.