Q bomb

So Jonah Friedman wrote a blog post on CSIS's Program on Nuclear Issues blog mostly rebutting my arguments. He was very fair and represented my views as well (or better) than I would have. He didn't agree with me, but not everyone does.

 Friedman admits some of the objections I have to nuclear deterrence (concerns that we don't really know how or why it operates - if it does). But he counters that we know nuclear weapons are dangerous and isn't that enough? Isn't that what creates nuclear deterrence? It got me thinking.

Imagine that you were worried about keeping your house safe and I gave you a special bomb that I said would do the job. "I call it the Q bomb," I said. "Put it in your basement, put this sign in your front yard and tell all your neighbors that you've got this bomb. Pretty soon the word will get around and no one will mess with you. Your family will be perfectly safe." The Q bomb doesn't take up much space - about the size of a small refrigerator - and so you put it in the basement next to the furnace. One day your wife is down doing the laundry and she hears the Q bomb making a strange rattling, clanking sound. You call me. "Is this Q bomb really safe? It's not going to go off accidentally or anything is it?" you ask. "Of course not," I say. "It's perfectly safe . . . probably." Now, put the phone down and go upstairs and tell your wife that the Q bomb is perfectly safe . . . probably.

Nuclear weapons are so dangerous and the level of destruction that could result from a nuclear war is so great that the standard of evidence for nuclear deterrence is higher. When the survival of a nation is on the line - and those are the stakes, aren't they? - doesn't it make sense to absolutely sure that the theory you're relying on is 100 percent reliable?

I don't believe we have that kind of proof for nuclear deterrence.